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Abstract: This article explores the volatile security situation in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria as it relates to what Watts (2001) conceptualizes 
as ‘petro-violence’ vis-à-vis Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation 
within the context of the country’s Fourth Republic (May 1999—). The 
prevailing precarious situation is examined to ascertain the potency of 
democracy and its influence in ameliorating the conflict trajectory in this 
resource rich region. Specifically, the paper addresses the following 
questions; what are the socio-economic and political factors that account 
for arms proliferation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta? Are there effects, either 
positive or negative, of arms proliferation on local conditions and the oil-
bearing communities? How can the situation be improved? What are the 
civilian government’s policy prescriptions to improve the dangerous 
politico-military situations in the oil delta? Thus, the central argument of 
this paper is that it is the failure of the social contract (in general and of 
arms in particular) on the part of the Nigerian government that leads to 
the challenge, by the people of Niger Delta, of the state’s legitimacy and 
its monopoly of the instruments of violence. The paper concludes by 
stating that since violence and arms proliferation in the Niger Delta are 
consequences of the breakdown of the social contract, then the solutions 
lie in reconstituting the social contract by addressing the root causes of 
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1. Introduction: Scope of the Problem 
 
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation 
has become one of the most endemic problems of our time 
and generally accounts for a greater proportion of human 
mortality in the world. Armed conflicts have led to the loss of 
lives of tens of thousands of innocent civilian population 
each year, while the number of wounded and disabled people 
resulted from the consequences of SALW proliferation and 
misuse is 13 times greater than those killed (Small Arms 
Survey, 2003: 57)1. In addition to fatalities from war, there 
are countless cases of indirect deaths and injuries occurring 
from increased pervasive security situations, increased 
disease morbidity, reduced easy access to heath services and 
malnutrition. In 2003 for example, it is estimated that more 
than 639 million of SALW were proliferating in the world out 
of which 60% of this arsenal was in the possession of the 
civilian population (Small Arms Survey, 2003: 13), while a 
further estimate of, between seven and eight million, new 
weapons are added to the world stockpile every year. 
Estimate of illicit SALW in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is put at 
one out of every five in the world. In this context, Bah (2004: 
33) contends that “of the approximately 500 million illicit 
weapons in circulation worldwide, it is estimated that 100 
million of these are in SSA with eight to ten million 
concentration in the West African sub-region alone.” 
 The situation in Africa is frightening because the 
region is the most backward in term of development and 
most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are 
concerned. One of the world’s highest concentrations of 
SALW is in Africa. This is a paradox. Why does a poor 
continent have such a magnitude of stockpiled small arms? 
What is the bone of contention that leads to conflicts in 
Africa? Perhaps, what explains this contradictory situation 
between economic underdevelopment (poverty) on the one 
hand and gun proliferation and armed conflicts on the other 
is the “strongest expression of the injustice in the paradox of 
wealth that characterizes situations of conflicts in Africa—
the fact that those who produce wealth are the poorest and 
those who are wealthy take the wealth by force” (Ibeanu, 
                                                
1
 See also Small Arms Survey, 2004, 2005. 
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2005: 37). This implies that the main reason for people to 
arm themselves is not only located in their appalling socio-
economic conditions but also exclusion, injustice and 
exploitation that they are subjected to and clearly, SALW 
(guns in particular) perform two functions, viz, they abet in 
sustaining injustices and also offer hopes for redressing 
injustices, thereby confirming Naylor’s assertion that the 
demand for SALW is a “surrogate for demand for social 
justice, and the firearm is the capital good intended to bring 
that objective” (cited in Dominick and Olonisakin, 2001; see 
also Naylor, 1995; Badmus, 2009a&b). 
 Nigeria is one of the Third World countries where the 
proliferation of this arsenal is manifested in crisis 
proportions and its society has become fully militarized and 
enmeshed in the culture of the gun. Perhaps, more than any 
other areas of the country, the Niger Delta region exhibits 
this tendency with a high degree of intensity where different 
oil-bearing ethnic minority groups, through their various 
social movements, are constantly contesting exploitation and 
as a result, oiling their guns as well as gunning for oil in the 
region, and fighting for the soul of the country’s treasury of 
natural resources. Nigeria’s oil delta has been a site of 
constant struggles over access to power, authority, and 
resources (oil wealth) among the recognized/identifiable 
forces, viz, the Nigerian state (represented by the Federal 
Government-FGN), the global capitalist forces (represented 
by the various multinational oil companies—MNOCs), and 
the ethnic minority nationalities (represented by local leaders 
and organizations). The Niger Delta region is the source of 
the country’s oil and over the last four decades, it has been 
able to produce the bulk of national wealth as oil fuels for 
the nation’s economy and its survival. With the availability of 
this gift of nature, one would expect Nigeria in general and 
the Niger Delta in particular to be economically developed 
and industrialized. Paradoxically, oil has encouraged 
corruption, rent-seeking, conflicts, with all their fissiparous 
tendencies for the Nigerian post-colony. Dishearteningly, in 
lieu of development, environmental apocalypse, ecological 
destruction and poverty are now synonymous with the region 
in question. This scenario has made the oil basin restive 
with pockets of insurrection and armed rebellion where such 
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ethnic minority groups as the Ijaw and Ogoni are challenging 
the central state and its business partners (MNOCs). 
Consequently, the Nigerian state has now institutionalized a 
regime of social repression and corporate violence to silence 
dissenting voices in order to protect oil exploration and its 
revenues. Today, the Niger Delta is confronted with social 
inequality, arms proliferation and pervaded by protracted 
violence championed by state security forces, ethnic militia 
movements, disgruntled youth, armed gangs, pirates, 
cultists, and robbers. 
Following from the preceding analysis, this study 
examines the volatile security situation in the Niger Delta as 
it relates to what Watts (2001) conceptualizes as ‘petro-
violence’ vis-à-vis SALW proliferation within the context of 
the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (May 1999--). I examine the 
prevailing precarious situation to ascertain the potency of 
democracy and its influence in ameliorating the conflict 
trajectory in this resource rich region. Specifically, the paper 
addresses the following research questions; what are the 
socio-economic and political factors that account for SALW 
proliferation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta? Are there effects, either 
positive or negative, of SALW proliferation on local conditions 
and the oil-bearing communities? How can the situation be 
improved? What are the civilian government’s policy 
prescriptions to improve the dangerous politico-military 
situations in the oil delta? Thus, my thesis is that, it is the 
failure of the social contract (in general and of arms in 
particular) on the part of the Nigerian government that leads 
to the challenge, by the people of Niger Delta, of the state’s 
legitimacy and its monopoly of the instruments of violence. 
 
 
2. Conceptual and Theoretical Statements 
 
I have argued earlier that it is the failure of the 
Nigerian state (especially under military rule) to meet the 
basic needs of the people (i.e. human security) that led to the 
collapse of the social contract, which eventually puts the 
state and society at loggerheads. Then to really fathom this 
collapse and the emergence of what is generally referred to 
as the “Hobbesian Niger Delta”, one need to search for its 
etiology within the context of both the endogenous and 
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exogenous factors. This is because the international socio-
political and economic contexts have overbearing effects on 
the local conditions especially in Nigeria’s oil basin.  
During the Cold War, especially in the immediate post-
independence years, African states were economically 
buoyant and this empowered them to provide adequate 
social services to the populace. Also, African states received 
huge financial assistance from the international financial 
institutions (IFIs), while the super powers did not relent in 
their pursuit of hegemonic interests and ideological 
supremacy, which saw the continent in a vantage position 
for financial and military aid from Moscow and Washington. 
To be sure, these sources of assistance, coupled with the 
‘relative’ economic boom of the early independence years, 
enabled African governments to maintain peace as a result of 
the state-driven expansionism in the socio-economic sector. 
The economic prosperity of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
started to show signs of wear and tear by the late 
1970s/early 1980s due to a plethora of negative socio-
economic factors. Thus, Africa’s economic downturn sooner 
or later ballooned into a full-blown economic crisis; thanks 
to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 that made oil price rise and 
fluctuate. The effects of the economic crisis were such that 
the capabilities of African governments to guarantee citizens’ 
welfare were completely weakened and eroded their 
legitimacies. In order to rescue the situation, African states 
responded by borrowing from the Bretton Wood Institutions 
with the acceptance of the neo-liberal, anti-statist, anti-
developmental Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) for 
the stabilization and recovery of their economies. SAP as 
policies work against the state; they are anti-state in that 
they call for the privatization of public enterprises, removal 
of subsidies and welfare support from social services, etc (i.e. 
its insistence on ‘Rolling Back the State’), and they also call 
for neo-liberal market reform based on the belief that the 
state was blocking economic growth and development by 
spending too much on welfare benefits in health, education 
and other subsidies (Vasudevan, 1999: 11-28). 
The implementation of SAP became counterproductive 
as it further weakened the state’s legitimacy by aggravating 
the pre-SAP social crisis. Furthermore, the gap between the 
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rich and the poor became widened, thereby reinforcing 
uneven development, which matches up to clear regional and 
ethnic divisions in a manner amplifying political tensions. 
Poverty in the rural areas led to ever increasing teeming 
populations of urban poor caused by rural to urban drift of 
people in search of employment and better life 
circumstances to support their families. Worse still is the 
social instability fuelled by a teeming population of 
disenchanted, marginalized and extremely pauperized people 
who can only become a ready pool of recruitment for ethnic 
zealots who fed on the dissatisfaction and insecurity (in 
terms of Human Security) of the majority of the citizenry 
(Badmus, 2006). The loss of control of the economies by the 
African governments and the state’s inability to rescue its 
sapping population, apparently fractured the basis of 
national unity, put the state and the society at dagger-drawn 
opposition to each other, and above all, compelled the 
masses to look for alternative structures (constructed 
around ethnicity and religion), to re-strategize their options, 
and saw these new structures as workable mechanisms for 
coping with the worsening economic crisis, of which 
privatization of security (i.e. acquisition of SALW for their 
own protection and as instruments of negotiation) is 
fundamental (Jega, 2000). Thus, African states (Nigeria 
inclusive) lost their power, legitimacy, and national cohesion 
since they failed to fulfill their own promises of the social 
contract. The social contract theory of arms postulates that 
citizens transfer the possession of weapons to a constituted 
authority (i.e. the sovereign and the state) with the 
agreement that the state will provide and guarantee people’s 
security (in all its connotations) while the ownership of such 
weapons is in the hands of the people which gives them (i.e. 
citizens) the opportunity to withdraw and reclaim self-
defense when states fail to honour their own obligations of 
the contract. In this context, ownership of arms is exercised1 
                                                
1
 Once again, Ibeanu expatiates further on the similarities and differences 
between ‘ownership’ and ‘possession’ with respect to social contract 
theory of arms. According to Ibeanu (2005): “ownership and possession 
are related but distinct. The former refers to the right in the last analysis to 
decide the ends to which society’s instruments of violence are to be put 
legitimately. Possession on the other hand, refers to the capacity to 
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as ‘the General will’ and not as ‘the Will of All’, which refers 
to the combination of sectional will that makes up the 
society. Since violence and arms proliferation in the Niger 
Delta are the result of the breakdown/collapse of the social 
contract (and of arms in particular), then the task is to 
“reconcile differences in the possession of these instruments 
of violence between the state and the populace until the 
social contract is reconstituted or resumes proper 
functioning. In so far as the legitimacy of the state at the 
local, state, and federal levels remain contested by a vast 
majority of people in the Niger Delta, they will continue to 
contest the right of the state and its agencies to monopolize 
society’s instruments of violence” (Ibeanu, 2005: 53), 
 In addition to the collapse of the social contract, the 
proliferation of arms and the intensity of the violent conflicts 
in Nigeria’s oil delta are attributed to the aftermaths of the 
twin forces of the end of the Cold War and the effects of 
globalization. The end of the hyper-militarization of the Cold 
War years, the collapse of the Soviet behemoth and its 
snowballing effects on the states of the former Eastern bloc, 
their state structures became dysfunctional which, 
inevitably, forced the former East European countries to 
reform their security sectors and downsize their military 
postures. These compelling realities provided one of the 
social contexts for weapon proliferation to the Third World 
countries of which Nigeria is no exception. These weapons 
were given free to many African states, especially conflict-
prone societies. The glut of SALW led to their misuse, 
privatization of security as well as the consequential 
weapons proliferation and criminalization of the society 
(Lock, 1999). The recent developments in the Niger Delta 
have shown that SALW proliferation has increased the 
intensity of armed struggles and as a result leads to further 
arms proliferation with telling effects on the security 
situation of the region. SALW are cheap, rugged, and easy to 
                                                                                                                      
actually put those instruments of violence to use. It is possession that 
government exercises through its coercive apparatuses. However, it is the 
citizens that are the owners of society’s instrument of violence, who 
confer possession on governments. Once citizens confer possession on 
government, it is sustained in so far as government incarnates.” 
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operate, transport and conceal. These features encourage 
their presence in the Niger Delta. The illegal trade in arms on 
the black market by local militant groups also encourages 
proliferation. Compounding the issue of SALW proliferation 
in the Niger Delta is the fact that it becomes more difficult to 
distinguish between licit and illicit trade in arms because 
weapons once officially sold to state statutory security forces 
are often stolen by military personnel only to re-appear on 
the black market as illegal weapons, thereby affecting the 
intensity and duration of conflicts in the Niger Delta. 
 
3.  Oil and the Nigerian State 
 
Oil is important to the Nigerian economy and its 
survival1. Nigeria is the world’s seventh largest oil producer 
and is among the lowest-cost sites of oil exploration in the 
world (Ikelegbe, 2005: 1). Oil accounts for about 40% of 
Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and between 70-
80% of Federal Government revenues. In 2003, about 80.6% 
of total Federal Government revenues came from oil and gas 
(Lawal, 2004). The Nigerian state has enacted various laws 
that empower it to control the oil sector while the 
government petroleum corporation holds majority of the 
shares in both onshore and offshore ventures. The operation 
of the oil sector of the economy is being run by the various 
MNOCs of which Shell is the primary player under the state 
military umbrella. MNOCs operate in joint ventures with the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). In the 
1970s, the Obasanjo military government embarked on 
indigenization policy that allowed the state to acquire 80% 
equity in Shell BP and 60% equity in other major MNOCs. 
The effects of the indigenization policy, unfavourable to 
foreign business interests, led to the cessation of operations 
by some oil companies; a sorry situation that led to 
downward trends in foreign investments in the country. In 
                                                
1
 On the significance of oil to Nigeria, literature is rich, see among others: 
Forrest, 1995; Turner and Peter, 1980; Watts, 2001; Watts, 2004 a&b; 
Watts, Okonta and von Kemedi, 2004. Oyefusi, 2001; International Crisis 
Group, 2006a&b; Human Rights Watch, 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2007; 
Ogunmola and Badmus, 2010. 
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1988, having realized the negative effects of the 
indigenization policy on the economy, the military 
government of General Ibrahim Babangida moved towards 
partial deregulation as well as commercialization of the oil 
sector with the creation of 11 subsidiaries. The Nigerian 
government has now deregulated the oil industry. This 
arrangement has, writes Zalik (2004: 404): “meant that 
individual government agents can profit immensely through 
‘rent’ or bribes accruing from oil contract kickbacks while in 
terms of productive capital and as an agent of development 
and security, the Nigerian state has remained largely 
incapacitated and often a force to be feared.”  
 Furthermore, oil revenue distribution to the federating 
states through a derivation-based allocation (known in 
Nigeria as the ‘derivation formula’) has been continuously 
declining. The Federal Government has, to the detriment of 
the ethnic minority nationalities, distorted the derivation 
formula. This is because during the 1950s when agriculture 
was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy; the constitution 
recognized 100% derivation as the basis for revenue 
allocation. The situation became different in the 1960s when 
derivation was reduced to 50%. It declined further to 45% in 
1970; 20% in 1975; 1.5% in 1982, and 3% in 1992 
respectively (see Table 1 and National Concord, 11 December 
1992). Under the 1999 constitution, there appears to be an 
appreciable development when derivation was increased to 
13% consequent on the agitations of the oil-bearing ethnic 
nationalities. Sadly, the derivation formula is, apparently, 
disenfranchising the people of the oil-delta since the region 
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Table 1: State and Federal Shares of Petroleum 







1953-1960 100 ---  
1960-1969 50 50 
1969-1971 45 55 
1971-1975 45 minus offshore 
proceeds 
55 plus offshore 
proceeds 
1975-1979 20 minus offshore 
proceeds 
80 plus offshore 
proceeds 
1979-1981 --- 100 
1982-1992 1.5 98.5 
1992-1999 3 97 
1999-- 13 87 
 Source:  UNDP 2006 
 
 The perceived marginalization by the people of Niger 
Delta has further intensified efforts for the increase in 
derivation to 50%, which became a hot issue during the 
2005 National Constitution Conference. In addition to the 
downward trends in the derivation formula to the detriment 
of the ethnic minority nationalities in the oil basin, 
derivation budget monitoring is unsystematic and chaotic. It 
was reported in 2002 that only 7.8% of the accrued revenues 
from oil resources was paid to the Niger Delta states1 by the 
federal government (A 2002 Report to the Federal 
Government cited in Manby, 2002). This state-of-affairs 
makes government statistics/figures on oil production and 
                                                
1
 Nigeria is made up of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). 
The Niger Delta’s geopolitics concerns 9 states and they are regarded as 
oil producing states. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
Isiaka Alani Badmus, University of New England (Australia) and the 
International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, 
Costa Rica) 
 




sales dubious. This perceived marginalization and lopsided 
state policy in the distribution of oil revenues have increased 
the anger and fanned the fire of hatred of the people of the 
region towards the Nigerian state and its ruling elite. 
Ironically, people outside the region are the ones benefiting 
from lucrative employment in the oil sector (Zalik, 2004). The 
rage towards the Nigerian state has created a situation of 
insecurity in the region, to which the Federal Government 
responded through the use of force (Omeje, 2004). The 
state’s security operatives have mercilessly handled the 
situation with negative consequences of human rights 
violations (Frynas, 2000; Manby, 2002). However, as the 
Nigerian state relies on the primitive accumulation from oil 
to reinforce its dominant position, the government becomes 
unpopular in the eyes of the marginalized ethnic minority 
groups (Watts, 2001).  
 
 
4. Understanding the Conflict in the Niger Delta 
 
The Niger Delta region is an area of about 70,000 sq. 
km of which 50% is wetland. It extends “from Forcados in 
the West to the Bonny River in the East, a distance of about 
350 km and from the apex of the delta at Abo to the 
coastline which is about 150km; the delta has also a narrow 
coastal strip varying in width from a few metres to about 
5km. Most of the 10,000 sq. km. of the delta is made up of 
swamps, with a few island of solid read earth, treading 
North-South, which forms the only firm dry land; the mean 
elevation of these islands is c.20 m” (Akintola, 1982: 8). The 
Niger Delta’s geopolitics concerns 9 states viz, Rivers, Cross 
River, Ondo, Abia, Edo, Imo, Akwa Ibom, Delta, and Bayelsa, 
while such ethnic minority groups as Ijaw, Kalabari, Urhobo, 
Itsekiri, Isoko, Nembe, Ibibio, Ndom, Efik, etc peopling the 
area. Since 1956 when oil was first discovered in Oloibiri 
village by the Anglo-Dutch group, Shell d’Archy, the region 
has continued being the heart of Nigeria’s oil industry as the 
country is now a major oil exporter and constitutes the fiscal 
base of the Nigerian state. From earnings as meager as $250 
million in 1970, oil production revenues soared to $11.2 
billion in 1974 (International Crisis Group, 2006a). The 
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phenomenal growth of the oil sector and its displacement of 
other sectors of the economy are revealed by the fact that the 
country generated about $300 billion between 1970 and 
2002 (Omotola, 2006: 10). Since the late 1970s, oil has 
displaced agriculture as the backbone of the economy. 
Omotola (2006: 8) argues that, “from less that 1% in 1960, 
the contribution of oil to GDP rose to 14.6, 21.9 and 26-29% 
in 1970, 1975, and 1979 respectively. By 1992, it had risen 
to 46.8%. Oil contribution to export earnings has been much 
higher. From 58.1% in 1970, it rose to 95.6% in 1979. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it remained very high, 
accounting for N210 billion or 96.1% of total export earnings 






Table 2: Crude Oil and Non-oil Export Earning in Nigeria, 
1988-1996  
Year Export of 
Goods and 
Services 







1988 31.7 89.5 10.5 8.8 
1989 63.2 87.0 13.0 4.7 
1990 120.1 88.8 11.2 2.3 
1991 132.4 88.3 11.7 3.5 
1992 226.9 88.3 11.2 1.9 
1993 245.7 87.0 13.0 2.0 
1994 215.5 93.2 6.8 2.5 
1995 875.5 92.0 8.0 2.3 
1996 1186.1 93.2 6.5 1.7 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, 1997 
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Despite the position of oil in the economy and huge revenues 
accruing to the central state from its sales, oil production 
has made the oil-bearing communities experiencing the so-
called paradoxes of the plenty; they are implying that they 
are dwelling in an environment rich in mineral resources but 
suffer socio-economic injustices and deprivations, which 
should not be the case seeing that the oil is derived from 
their traditional homelands. Thus, oil exploration has 
brought sufferings and mishaps to the oil-bearing ethnic 
nationalities in many ways. 
 Oil extraction has adversely affected the delicate 
balance between land, water, and life (Rowell, 1994) as the 
socio-economic and environmental costs of oil production to 
the Niger Delta’s oil-bearing communities are enormous. Oil 
production in the region has led to the destruction of flora 
and fauna resources, the aquatic ecosystem, biodiversity, 
and farmlands. Water and air pollution are prevalent in the 
region with serious health hazards suffered by the hapless 
population. More often than not, the level of pollutions 
caused by gas flaring, oil pipeline leakages and oil waste 
dumping are worrisome going by the level of ecological and 
physical damages experienced in the Niger Delta and their 
negative consequences on the socio-economic well being of 
the local population. It is estimated that 75% of gas 
produced in the oil delta are flared annually (World Bank, 
2005). The environmental degradation and the destruction of 
the region can be attributed to bad oil production practices 
by the MNOCs. Gas and oil pipelines are badly laid above 
ground all over the Niger Delta’s villages without constant 
maintenance by the oil companies. Most of the time, these 
pipelines explode while oil leaks into the soil and water 
interfering with local subsistence economies, sustainable 
livelihoods and causing environmental degradation as well as 
ecosystem decline. For example, between 1976 and 1990, 
Agbu (2003) asserts that “about 3,000 oil spill incidents were 
reported by the oil companies operating in Nigeria. Indeed, 
within this period over 2 million barrels of oil spilled into the 
country’s terrestrial, coastal and offshore marine 
environment.” The effects of oil spillages are negative as the 
drinking water in most places is heavily contaminated. The 
ground water of the costal environment of the Niger Delta is 
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polluted to the extent that there is increase in the maximum 
permissible concentration (MPC) of crude oil found in the 
ground water. It is reported that, according to Agbu (2003), 
in 1987, the MPC in Port Harcourt groundwater is estimated 
to be 1.8 milligrams per litre far above the 0.1 milligrams per 
litre recommended by the World Health Organisation. 
  Furthermore, the oil companies have been accused of 
being responsible for the oil spills since they are insensitive 
to the environmental concerns of the local population as 
there is a lack of consultation between the MNOCs and the 
oil-bearing communities before the commencement of oil 
exploration. The consequences oil production become more 
frustrating going by this shocking revelation: 
 
According to an independent record of Shell’s spills 
from 1982 to 1992, 1,626,000 gallons were spilt from 
the company’s operation in 27 separate incidents. 
Shell indeed admits that there are at least 200 
spillages of different sizes in a year in recent times. Of 
the number of spills recorded from Shell—a company, 
which operates in more than 100 countries—40% were 
in Nigeria. According to Shell, though they are 
committed to containing and cleaning up spills, it is 
almost impossible to take effective measures short of 
burning off the oil altogether, thereby annihilating a 
large part of the surrounding forest (cited in Agbu, 
2003). 
 
 Thus, this environmental degradation and its negative 
physical and socio-economic consequences have been the 
sources of constant struggles by the people of the region that 
eventually put them at loggerheads with the central state 
and MNOCs. The objectives of the two forces are 
diametrically opposed as the local populations are yearning 
towards the environmental protection of the region as well as 
securing their socio-economic and human development. The 
state and its business partners on the other hand aim at 
undisrupted oil production and maximize profit there-from. 
(See Boxes 1&2 for analysis on the effects of oil spills and 
gas faring in the region). 
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Box 1: Oil Spills in the Niger Delta 
Between 1976 and 2001, a total of 6,817 oil spills have been recorded in 
the Niger Delta with only 70% of the oil spills being recovered (UNDP, 
2006). This has had a huge impact on marine life with negative 
consequences for local livelihoods dependent on fishing and for human 
health consuming contaminated seafood (EIA, 2003). Decades of 
inadequate or non-existent environmental regulation have allowed oil 
companies to operate their facilities without incorporating the costs of 
environmental damage into their decision-making. Spills can occur for a 
number of different reasons. Shell measures the number of oil spills 
annually at its facilities along specific criteria: whether the spills were the 
result of corrosion, operational failure (machinery or human error), or 
sabotage. In recent years there appears to have been an increase in the 
number of oil spills caused by deliberate attempts to damage oil facilities. 
According to Shell, 69% of the 241 total oil spill incidents recorded in 
2006 occurred as a result of sabotage (Shell, 2006). 
Source: Francis and Sardesai, 2008 
                 
 
Box 2: Second Largest Gas Flaring Operation in the World 
Gas flaring is a process whereby the associated gas from oil production is 
burned so as to dispose of it. The second largest gas flaring operations in 
the world, after Russia, occur in the Niger Delta; they are a significant 
source of greenhouse gas and particulate matter emissions, exposing 
communities to a number of harmful pollutants including sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxide, and carcinogenic substances. A thorough study of the 
region has not yet been carried out, however, it is widely accepted that 
these pollutants are linked to a series of significant health problems 
(ERA, 2005). 
 
The exact percentage of associated gas that is flared is disputed. 
According to the NNPC, Nigeria flares 40% of its annual natural gas 
production (EIA, 2007). The World Bank estimates that the figure is 
closer to 75% (World Bank, 2005). Shell and other energy companies 
operating in the region attribute the extent of flaring in the Niger Delta to 
the lack of local and regional markets for gas, as well as to the lack of 
adequate gas infrastructure. Gas export is identified as the main solution 
to the problem and has become a central part of Shell’s efforts to 
decrease its flaring operation (Shell, 2006). 
 
In 1996, the Nigerian government agreed to end gas flaring in the Niger 
Delta by 2008. However, the penalties imposed for flaring have been too 
modest to achieve this goal (ICG, 2006b). In its most recent annual 
report, Shell Nigeria has set a deadline. By this time the company states 
that it will have either found ways to gather associated gas, or it will shut 
in production from the fields where associated gas cannot be gathered 
(Shell 2006). Chevron Nigeria is also working towards eliminating gas 
flaring from its operations but does not set itself a firm deadline. All new 
Chevron developments in the Niger Delta, however, are being designed as 
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“zero flare” projects (Chevron Nigeria, 2007). The World Bank/UNDP 
2004 Strategic Gas Plan for Nigeria identified the gas sector as an area of 
huge growth potential for the country and underlined the importance of 
bringing an end to flaring as the first step in tapping this potential 
(ESMAP, 2004). 
Source: Francis and Sardesai, 2008 
 
Beyond the environmental apocalypse suffered by the 
people of Niger Delta, it is possible to locate the tensions in 
the region within the context of the lopsided state policies 
and distributive federalism that are to the detriment of 
ethnic minority groups. Apart from the fact that the current 
oil revenue sharing formula is to the ethnic minority groups 
disadvantage, their rage also stem from the fact that the 
region has been neglected and alienated for years with lack 
of basic infrastructure facilities such as pipe borne water, 
electricity and health care facilities with high rate of 
unemployment among the youth (Ukeje, 2001a). This 
perception is being aggravated by the claim that the 
proceeds from their God given mineral resources (oil in this 
case) are being used to develop other parts of the country 
that are non oil producing states. The consequences of these 
frustrations led to confrontations between the local 
population and the state with its business partners. 
Ethnic nationalism and ethnic politics have added 
their flavours to, and at the same time aggravate, the conflict 
situation in the oil-basin. Ethnic nationalism has impacted 
on Nigeria in so many ways but one important area that is of 
interest to this study is the creation of Local Government 
Areas and the sitting of their headquarters and how this has 
increased the tempo of ethnic nationalism and conflicts in 
the region.  Under the military, especially during the 
authoritarian rule of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani 
Abacha, more Local Government Areas were created. In 
1997, crisis erupted in Warri, a town in Delta state between 
ethnic Ijaw and the Itsekiri over the newly created Warri 
South Local Government Area. The Ijaw/Itsekiri ethnic 
clashes, rooted in the relocation of the headquarters of the 
newly created Warri South Local Government from Ogbe-Ijoh 
to Ogidigben, resulted in many deaths, displacement and 
property worth millions of naira destroyed. As part of their 
ethnic nationalism, the Ijaw have clashed with other ethnic 
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minority groups such as the Ilaje, Urhobo, etc in the region 
over land and other issues (Fregene, 2000).  
 
 
5. Contesting Exploitation:  Armed Violence and the 
Proliferation of SALW in the Niger Delta 
 
The Niger Delta has been a site of constant struggles 
where the state and local communities were at each other’s 
throats but the scale of violence witnessed in the 1990s 
became worrisome to the international community. In the 
1990s and the decade that followed the region witnessed the 
emergence of social movements that were at the forefront of 
resistance against exploitation. Prominent among these 
movements are the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Niger 
Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Egbesu 
Boys of Africa (EBA) (Badmus, 2009c: 29-36). The activities 
of these groups, despite the fact that they have been able to 
place their demands on the national agenda and become 
popular beyond the shores of Nigeria have as a result 
become threats to the survival of the Nigerian post-colonial 
state. The nexus between and among armed violence, state 
repressions and the proliferation of SALW in the region will 
be more comprehensible by analyzing, in extenso, the 
activities of the two prominent social movements in the 
region, i.e. MOSOP and INC and their implications for the 
Nigerian state. 
 The Ogoni resistance, championed by MOSOP, is 
interweaving around the struggles against environmental 
degradation and social marginalization. The struggles clearly 
unveil the intensity of the restiveness of the local population 
as well as its negative implications for the Nigerian state. The 
struggles that started as a peaceful demonstration took a 
dangerous turn in 1990 with the issuance of the Ogoni Bill 
of Rights by MOSOP, which was presented to then military 
government of General Ibrahim Babangida. In the Ogoni Bill 
of Rights, the Ogoni people demanded adequate 
compensation for the destruction of their land and water and 
a reasonable share of the $30 billion that Nigeria has 
received from the sale of crude oil derived from Ogoniland 
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since 1958 (MOSOP, 1992). According to the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights, poverty, environmental hazards, lack of health 
facilities and social amenities are synonymous with the 
issues experienced by the people of Ogoniland (Badmus, 
2009c). The Ogoni ethnic nationalism gained momentum 
when, in August 19991, MOSOP presented an addition to 
the Ogoni Bill of Rights which internationalized their 
struggles and reaffirmed their non-violence approach to 
conflict resolution. In December 1992, the Ogoni people 
issued an ultimatum to the military government. In the 
ultimatum, the Ogoni demanded that both the MNOCs and 
the NNPC have to pay compensation within a month to the 
Ogoni people or stop operations and leave their land. The 
failure of the Nigerian military government to acquiesce to 
the Ogoni demands saw, at the expiration of the ultimatum, 
extraordinary peaceful demonstrations in which more than 
30,000 took part. The importance of this demonstration was 
that it brought the Ogoni issue on the national agenda and 
also through these struggles; it caught the attentions of the 
international community. 
 The aftermath of this peaceful protest was the serious 
clampdown on protesters and, arrests and detentions 
without trial of MOSOP leaders. The leaders of the 
organization were subjected to all sorts of inhuman 
treatments, while the lucky ones fled the country to avoid 
persecution. Throughout 1993, the Ogoni people were restive 
with the state relying on brute force and imposition of fear to 
suppress the uprisings. In addition to force, the then military 
regime weakened the cohesion among the Ogoni people as 
the government’s divide and rule method actually yielded 
dividends. Consequent on government’s divisive tactics, a 
face-off ensued between the radical and the moderate 
elements within MOSOP, a situation that encouraged the 
proliferation of deadly weapons and the use of mercenaries 
in the region (Renner, 2002: 46). State violence against the 
Ogoni people and its divide and rule policy also saw the 
upsurge in violent conflict between the Ogoni and their 
neighbours. Superficially, this may appears as ethnic 
conflicts and used by the government as an excuse to deal 
with the Ogoni people with the use of violence (Nsirimovu, 
2005: 162). But a close look at the nature and occurrence of 
conflicts among the former peace loving people as well as the 
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type of weapons used convey a clear message that “…broader 
forces might have been interested in perhaps putting the 
Ogoni people under pressure, probably to derail their 
agenda” (Ake cited in Human Rights Watch, 1995: 12). 
Prominent among these conflicts were the ones in Andoni 
(July 1993), Okrika (December 1993), and Ndoki (April 1994) 
in which many lives were lost and property worth millions of 
naira equally destroyed. 
      Reverting to the division among the Ogoni 
leadership, the internal division reached its zenith in May 
1994 with the killing of four prominent Ogoni leaders; barely 
a year after the military junta passed a decree stipulating a 
death penalty for all acts of treason. Thus, with this tensed 
military situation in the Niger Delta, the military saw the 
golden opportunity to deal with the Ogoni crisis once and for 
all. The government did not waste time to arrest and execute 
the radical leaders of MOSOP, Ken Saro Wiwa and eight 
other Ogoni leaders, after the Special Military Tribunal found 
them guilty of the murders on 10 November 1995 (Rowell et 
al, 2005; Renner, 1996; Renner, 2002: 46). The death of Ken 
Saro Wiwa could be, probably, regarded as the end of the 
Ogoni struggles against state marginalization since it lost the 
dynamism and militancy associated with it due to lack of 
unity among the Ogoni leaders. 
 Another important conflict in the oil delta is the ethnic 
Ijaw struggles against perceived state suppression and socio-
economic marginalization. The rise of Ijaw struggles was 
coincided with the seemingly decline of the Ogoni resistance 
following execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and others and direct 
state repression of the Ogoni. The Ijaw-state-oil companies 
face-off centered on years of injustice and socio-economic 
neglect of the oil-bearing Ijaw nation. With the sad 
experiences of the Ogoni struggles in their minds, one would 
expect the Ijaw resistance to be more violent. Unsurprisingly, 
when in August 1997, over 10,000 youth of Ijaw origin 
demonstrated at Aleibiri village in Bayelsa State1 demanding 
an end to Shell activities in the oil Delta, the Ijaw people 
                                                
1
 Though the Ijaw ethnic group, spread across the Niger Delta region, are 
majorly found in Bayelsa State. The state was created in 1996 while 
Yenegoa is the capital. 
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vowed to liberate themselves from the bondage of 
exploitation. The state, oil companies and Ijaw youth 
confrontations intensified especially in Bayelsa State due to 
environmental destruction by Shell and other MNOCs 
operating in the area that are threatening the livelihoods of 
the local population. Between 1998 and 1999, the Ijaw youth 
became more restive and most of these agitations occurred 
in Bayelsa State and culminated in the first Egbesu1 war 
(Ibeanu, 2005: 45; Omeje, 2004). The origin of the war could 
be traced to the detention without trial of an Ijaw youth 
leader for distributing ‘seditious’ documents against the then 
Military Governor of Bayelsa State. Thus, the militant 
Egbesu Boys reacted by liberating their detained leader from 
the Government House in Yenegoa having disarmed the 
soldiers on sentry. Ibeanu (2005: 46) contends that “the 
success of the first Egbesu war obviously enhanced the 
profile of the youths and cult, and encouraged more people, 
many of whom were unemployed, to join the protests. In a 
matter of weeks, the invincibility of the Egbesu had spread 
throughout Bayelsa State and beyond, and the success of 
the Egbesu youth in the ‘first war’ fed into wider demands by 
the Ijaw for more petroleum revenues.” 
 The death of General Abacha in office in 1998 and the 
rise of General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1998) had 
direct impacts on the Ijaw wars. Immediately after General 
Abubakar took over, he embarked on reconciliatory agendas 
to solve the internal political deadlocks that marked General 
Abacha’s dictatorship. In this context, the already militarized 
and reduced political space opened up and people’s 
fundamental human rights were guaranteed. With this 
development, the Ijaw youth became more vigorous and 
assertive in the pursuit of their demands. At the Ijaw Youth 
Convention in Kaiama town on 11 December 1998, a 
document, popularly known as the Kaiama Declaration, was 
issued that was addressed to the military government in 
which they requested for increased local control of oil 
revenues and better environmental practices 
(http://www.ijawcenter.com/kaiama_declaration.html). In 
                                                
 
1
 Egbesu connotes the Ijaw god of war that protect them during armed 
conflicts and wars since the olden days. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
Isiaka Alani Badmus, University of New England (Australia) and the 
International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, 
Costa Rica) 
 




the Kaiama Declaration, a deadline of 31st December 1998 
was given to the federal government and MNOCs to meet 
their demands; otherwise the MNOCs should close their 
operations and leave the Ijaw land and the entire Niger Delta 
region. The declaration was followed by a peaceful 
demonstration in Yenegoa by Ijaw youth to give vent to their 
demands and also during this demonstration they passed 
across their grievances to the Federal Government through 
the Bayelsa state government. Dishearteningly, the Ijaw 
youth peaceful demonstration resulted in disaster when 
soldiers killed scores of youths leaving many injured (Ukeje, 
2001b). The Ijaw youth and the entire Ijaw nation interpreted 
the situation as an open declaration of war by the Nigerian 
government on ethnic Ijaw. Thus, the Ijaw became more 
restive with consequential military build-up and arms 
proliferation made the security situation to deteriorate 
rapidly. The tensed situation, apparently, makes the second 
Egbesu war imminent and eventually started when the state 
security forces clashed with Ijaw youth who were 
participating in a cultural festival in Yenegoa. The clash left 
many dead and had chilling consequences on the Ijaw 
nation, especially in Yenegoa and Kaiamna (Ibeanu, 2005: 
47).  
 The inception of the Nigerian Fourth Republic in May 
1999 seems, especially during the Obasanjo’s presidency 
(May 1999-May 2007), not to have any significant impact in 
reducing the spectre of conflict in the Niger Delta. The 
military invasion of Odi town in Kolokuma-Opokuma Local 
Government Area of Bayelsa state in November 1999 
confirms the above line of reasoning. This is probably why 
Ibeanu (2005: 47) argues that the Odi incident “confirms the 
fears of human rights community that it will take some time 
before the vestiges of the rule of the militariat in Nigeria are 
eliminated.” The proximate cause of the Odi massacre was 
the abduction and subsequent killings of seven policemen 
that were on intelligence mission in Odi1, the second largest 
                                                
1
 The seven policemen were in Odi to uncover the plan of Ijaw youth to 
attack ethnic Yoruba in Lagos as a reprisal for the O’Odua People’s 
Congress’ (OPC)-a pan Yoruba ethnic militant organisation- attacks on 
Ijaw residents of Ajegunle Area of Lagos a month earlier.   
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town in Bayelsa state after Yenegoa, by some Odi youth. The 
killings of the policemen were interpreted by the Obasanjo’s 
government as Egbesu challenge to the Nigerian state. The 
President gave a two weeks ultimatum to then Bayelsa state 
Governor, Chief DSP Alamieyeseigha, to produce the 
culprits, the failure of which saw the Federal Government 
ordered the Odi punitive military expedition (known as 
Operation HAKURI II) in which over 2000 people lost their 
lives, thousands displaced and properties destroyed 
(Environmental Rights Action, 2002: 7; Albert, 2003). The 
terrifying consequences of Odi incident did not deter the Ijaw 
youth as the spate of struggles in the oil delta continues 
unabated. Presently, the Ijaw resistance is championed by 
such militant groups as the Mujahedeen Asari Dokubo’s led 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Tom Ateke’s 
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) [see Table 3 for the 
profiles and activities of selected militant groups in the Niger 
Delta]. Since 2003, NDPVF and MEND (created in 2005) have 
proved deadly with increased pipeline vandalism, 
kidnappings and taking over oil facilities in the volatile Niger 
Delta.  Both movements claim that their activities are to seek 
a redistribution of oil wealth and increased local control of 
their God given resources. These groups are notorious for 
kidnappings of oil workers (especially expatriates) for ransom 
with negative consequences on the Nigerian state since the 
deteriorating security has forced some oil services firms to 








                                                
 
1
 It should stated here that the existence and activities of these movements 
are very important in understanding the intensity of armed conflicts and 
arms proliferation in the region with their negatives consequences on the 
Nigerian post-colony. But the scope of this study is limited to the Ogoni 
and Ijaw struggles within the contexts of MOSOP and INC. 
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Table 3: Select Militant Groups Operating in the Niger Delta 
Group Description Activities 
Egbesu Boys of Africa • Militant arm of the 
Ijaw Youth Council 
• Seeks justice and 
equity for the oil-
bearing Ijaw 
communities in the 
Niger Delta 
• Not a cohesive 
militant movement; 
members are active 
in other groups  




attacks on oil 
installations. 
Niger Delta Peoples 
Volunteer Forces 
(NDPVF) 
• Led by Mujahedeed 
Asari Dokubo 
• Founded in 2003 
• Members mainly 
Ijaw 
• Demands more 
control over 
resources for the 
Niger Delta states 
• Modelled on Isaac 
Boro’s Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force 
(1966) 
Declared all-out wars 
vs. Nigerian 
government in 2004 
and was subsequently 
outlawed; violent 
confrontation with NDV 
mid-2003 to late 2004; 
kidnappings and 
attacks 
Niger Delta Vigilante 
(NDV) 
• Led by Ateke Tom 
• Members mainly 
Ijaw 
Violent confrontation 
with NDPVF mid-2003 
to late 2004; 
kidnappings and 
attacks 
Movement for the 
Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) 
• Emerged December 
2005 
• Close links to 
NDPVF 
• Demands: 100% 
control of oil wealth; 
release of Dokubo; 
release of 
Alamieyeseigha 
• Elusive leadership; 
Jomo Gbomo 
communicates with 
media via email 
Many of the recent 
hostage tasking and 
attacks on oil facilities; 
armed clashes with 
security forces 
between 2005 and 
January 2006. 
Sources: Sesay et al 2003 and ICG 2006b 
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6. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic and the Niger Delta 
Crisis 
 
Since the inception of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (May 
1999-), successive civilian administrations have been 
working towards finding permanent solutions to the Niger 
Delta crisis. Prior to this period, previous governments 
especially under military rule have also made numerous 
efforts to ameliorate the conflict trajectory and improve the 
appalling socio-economic conditions of the people of the 
region. But these efforts have not been able to achieve the 
stated goals. This situation becomes more complicated when 
the oil-bearing communities see the Nigerian state as perfect 
collaborator with MNOCs purposely to destroy the Niger 
Delta environment. The Babangida military administration 
responded to the dumping of toxic waste of Italian origin in 
Koko, a town in Delta state by establishing, through Decree 
88 of 1988, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(FEPA). FEPA was to set up national guidelines and 
standards for environmental management and enforce 
compliance with environmental law in order to control 
pollution (Falomo, 1997).  Though, FEPA looked promising at 
the conceptual level, but in practice it failed to achieve its 
goals of effective managing the Niger Delta ecosystem due, 
partly, to the ambiguities in its terms of reference, which 
many experts believe were too broad ( Agbu, 2003). Thus, the 
failure of FEPA to alter the conflict dynamics of the oil delta, 
sooner or later led to the establishment of the National Policy 
on Environment (NPE) in 1988 to preserve the Niger Delta 
environment and also to tackle the development challenges 
in the area. But, NPE achieved little in terms of success. 
What can be described as a giant stride towards solving the 
Niger Delta crisis was the establishment of, by the 
Babangida military government, the Oil Minerals Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992. 
OMPADEC could have done much to improve the situation in 
the Niger Delta but its organizational structure and 
management were fraught with difficulties. This is because, 
the body was directly under the supervision of the 
presidency while its members were government appointees 
and only answerable to the presidency. 
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 Furthermore, in the area of funding, OMPADEC relied 
on the 3% derivation fund controlled by the federal 
government. I have argued elsewhere (Badmus, 2009c) that 
since “OMPADEC members were government appointees, 
they were not truly representatives of the oil-bearing 
communities of the Niger Delta, thereby serving the interests 
of the federal bourgeoisies and its oil minority allies…The 
issue of corruption was brought to the fore with the 
embezzlement of the contracts’ fund, politicization in 
contracts’ awards, and above all, the people of the Niger 
Delta were not part of the decision making process of 
OMPADEC. All these made the Commission’s effectiveness, 
efficiency and impacts on the conditions of the oil-bearing 
communities of the Niger Delta hardly noticeable.” The 
problems that encumbered OMPADEC and its inability to 
achieve its aims could be regarded as the background to the 
establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) shortly after Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn 
into office as Nigeria’s President in May 1999. After assessing 
the situation through first hand experience during his tour 
of the region, he sent the NDDC Bill to the National 
Assembly and its approval gave birth to the NDDC. The 
NDDC is tasked to prepare and implement a comprehensive 
multi-sector master plan for the development of the Niger 
Delta (NDDC, 2005). The Commission is, through its ad hoc 
structure, expected to enhance the development of the region 
via identifying and addressing the needs of the oil bearing 
ethnic minorities and through this, it is hoped that such 
efforts will complement the efforts of the state governments 
and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contribution to the 
development of oil delta. It should be mentioned that the 
numerous Niger Delta states have also embarked on the 
implementation of their own programmes. These include: the 
Ondo State Oil Producing Area Development Commission 
(OSODAPEC)(http://www.ondostate.gov.ng/news_details.ph
p?id=1529), Rivers State Sustainable Development 
Programme (RSSDP), Bayelsa Partnership Initiatives (BPI), 
the Delta State Oil Area Development Commission 
(DESOPADEC) (http://www.desopadec.org/ see Francis and 
Sardesai, 2008: 30). 
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 In the area of finance, there is appreciable 
development in the funding of the Commission (i.e. NDDC) 
when compared to OMPADEC, for this responsibility lies 
with both the State and MNOCs. Contributions to the 
Commission are as follows: MNOCs operating in the Niger 
Delta contribute 3% of their annual budgets; the Federal 
Government contributes 15% of the Niger Delta states oil 
revenues (i.e. 13% derivation) and 50% of the Niger Delta 
states ecological fund allocations (Francis and Sardesai, 
2008: 31; see also ANEEJ, 2004: 22). Through this financial 
muscle, the Commission has been able to achieve some 
‘relative’ successes by implementing community-
development projects, put in place ‘limited’ social 
infrastructure facilities but these should not be over 
romanticized because like previous efforts, the Commission’s 
activities/operations were fraught with lack of transparency, 
under funding and lack of proper planning that had not been 
able to fully achieve its mandate (Hopfensperger, 2006). 
Despite the activities of the NDDC in the region, popular 
perceptions are always against the Commission (see Box 3).     
 
 
Box 3: Perceptions of the NDDC 
Many local people have expressed dissatisfaction with the way that the 
NDDC has operated in their region. According to the UNDP 2006 Human 
Development Report for the Niger Delta, many view the NDDC with 
suspicion and do not appreciate the top-down planning approach the 
Commission has taken. Members of the NDDC are appointed by the 
federal government. As a result, local people question the commitment of 
the NDDC to the region. Some feel that the organisation’s loyalties lie 
more with the federal government and oil companies than the Niger Delta 
and its people (UNDP 2006: 13). Discontent felt by the local people has 
added to an already deteriorating relationship with both the federal 
government and the oil companies (Hopfensperger, 2006). 
The NDDC has got mixed reviews from militants. The Niger Delta 
Coalition for the Advancement of Peace and Progress (NIDECOPP) has 
advocated greater government support to the NDDC as a way of dealing 
with militant demands (Akunna, 2006). MEND, on the other hand, has 
made its opposition to the organization very clear. In December 2006, the 
group claimed responsibility for detonating a bomb close to the NDDC 
headquarters in Port Harcourt. In an online statement after the bombing, 
MEND referred to the managing director of the Commission as having 
acted “against the interest of the people of the Niger Delta” (Arubi and 
Onoyume, 2006). The group has also criticised the NDDC for its alleged 
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corrupt practices and for executing projects outside of the Niger Delta. 
Other groups have also tried to draw attention to their dissatisfaction 
with the NDDC. For example, in January 2004 a group of Ijaw youths 
vandalized the NDDC offices in Warri, Delta State, as a means of 
protesting the marginalization of their communities (ICG, 2006a). 
Source: Francis and Sardesai, 2008 
 
The ascendancy of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua to the presidency 
on 29 May 2007 increased the hope that the Niger Delta 
problems will be solved once and for all going by the 
commitments of the President to engage in dialogues with all 
stakeholders and initiate policies that are inclusive in 
nature. In his inaugural address to the country, President 
Yar’Adua stated: 
 
The crisis in the Niger Delta commands our attention 
and it is a matter of strategic importance to our 
country. I will use every resource available to me to 
address this crisis in a spirit of fairness, justice and 
cooperation. We have a good starting point because 
our predecessor has already launched a master plan 
that can serve as a basis for a comprehensive 
examination of all issues. 
We will involve all stakeholders in working out a 
solution. As part of these efforts, we will move quickly 
to ensure the security of lives and property and 
investment. In the meantime, I appeal to all aggrieved 
communities to suspend all forms of violence. Let us 
allow the impending dialogue to take place in a 
conducive atmosphere. We are all in this together, and 
we will find a way to achieve peace and justice. (Full 
text of the inaugural address of President Yar’Adua 




The first step that the Yar’Adua administration took to 
resolve the crisis was to propose a Niger Delta Summit that 
was initially scheduled for June 2007. The proposed Summit 
was intended to develop a comprehensive roadmap towards 
resolving the crisis. But, right from the beginning, the 
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proposed Niger Delta Summit was encumbered with 
controversy, which, on the advice of the Niger Delta leaders, 
was postponed by the government and eventually failed to 
see the light of the day. There was lack of consensus on the 
way to approach the Summit. While the Federal Government 
considered the Niger Delta’s crisis as purely Nigeria’s 
domestic affairs, the people of Niger Delta insisted on the UN 
and other international meditations (International Crisis 
Group, 2009). Furthermore, the proposed Summit was even 
regarded by the majority of stakeholders as unnecessary that 
will result in failure. The majority of Niger Delta leaders 
argued that the best way to address the crisis is for the 
government to, instead of the Niger Delta Summit; 
reconsider the reports of the previous committees and study 
groups on the Niger Delta. They urged the government to 
form a committee to consider the recommendations of those 
previous committees’ reports and present them for action. 
Fuelling the angers of the Niger Delta people was the 
appointment of Professor Ibrahim Gambari as head of the 
Summit Steering Committee. Gambari was seen not as ideal 
choice by the people of the region and opposition to 
Gambari’s appointment was based on his, as Nigeria’s 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 1995, 
defence of the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other 
Ogoni leaders by General Abacha and also that he is not an 
indigene of Niger Delta. Opposition to Gambari’s 
appointment even came from other parts of the country 
when the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) contended that: 
“Gambari had lost credibility by hurting local sensibilities.” 
(The Nigerian Labour Congress Statement signed by its 
General Secretary John Odah, 4 July 2008). Due to stiff 
opposition, Gambari withdrew and the Federal Government 
succumbed to popular pressures and shelved the idea of the 
Niger Delta Summit and replaced it with, after consultations 
with Niger Delta leaders, the establishment of a Technical 
Committee to work on the needs of the region and report. 
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the collapse of the summit at an advanced stage and 
the fact that opposition to Gambari erupted only after 
his appointment had been announcement indicated 
that, in planning for the summit, the government had 
not communicated and coordinated with Delta ethnic 
and militant leaders adequately. More disturbingly, it 
meant that after over a year in office, an administration 
that had identified the Delta challenge, as a priority 
area was still the lead actor in search of a script. 
(Italics added).  
 
Though the Federal Government inaugurated a 
Technical Committee, with broad terms of reference, its 
recommendations have not been able to meet the aspirations 
of the people of the Niger Delta, especially the militant 
groups. Amongst others, the committee recommended 
amnesty for militant leaders within a context of 
comprehensive demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) programme; increased allocation of oil 
revenues to the people of the Niger Delta; improvement of 
infrastructure and welfare services, and new institutional 
frameworks for the Niger Delta’s long term socio-economic 
and physical development (International Crisis Group, 2009). 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the Technical Committee 
recommendations, many became skeptical of the government 
position going by the President’s position that the 
government would implement only those recommendations 
that it found acceptable, and this call into question the 
sincerity of the federal government in solving the Niger Delta 
crisis (International Crisis Group, 2009: 1). Unfortunately, 
the inherent gaps in the Committee’s reports and lack of 
government’s sincerity failed to dampen tensions in the 
region as the attacks on oil installations, kidnappings, etc by 
the militant groups intensified. The Conference of Ethnic 
Nationalities of the Niger Delta (CENND) was very critical of 
the Committee report arguing that it disappointed the Niger 
Delta people because, it failed to recommend an initial 
minimum of 50% derivation revenue and full control of their 
resources. Finally, it vowed that “nothing short of control of 
resources, with payment of appropriate taxes to the federal 
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government would satisfy grievances.” (See the statement by 
the Steering Committee of CENND at the end of its meeting 
in Uzere, Delta state, 17 December 2008, cited in 
International Crisis Group, 2009)  
 Other significant initiative of the Yar’Adua 
administration is creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta 
Affairs. The ministry, established in September 2008, is 
responsible to provide infrastructure development and 
empower the Niger Delta youth. This is, undoubtedly, a 
positive development because the newly created ministry will 
provide a better focused and rapid implementation of 
programmes and projects for the well being of the aggrieved 
people tasking cognizance of the fact that these roles were 
previously performed by several ministries which created 
problem of coordination. Despite the fact that the creation of 
the ministry demonstrated a degree of commitment by the 
Yar’Adua administration to the people of Niger Delta, MEND 
contended that: “The people of the region should receive this 
latest dish with apprehension. It will be yet another avenue 
for corruption and political favouritism.” (See “Nigeria 
Militants Criticize New Niger Delta Ministry”, Reuters, 11 
September 2008).Though the creation of the ministry can be 
regarded as a very important step towards addressing the 
crisis in the Niger Delta; unfortunately it attracted a lot of 
acrimony. First, the mere fact that the Technical Committee 
was still working on the appropriate ways to solve the crisis 
when the ministry was created signifies the government has 
a hidden agenda. The government would have waited for the 
Technical Committee to submit its report before taking such 
steps. Also problematic is that the creation of the ministry 
has opened door for other regional and ethnic groups to 
demand for ‘region-specific ministries’ which can overstretch 
the state.  
Furthermore, the ministry’s mandate and 
responsibilities conflict with that of the NDDC which 
resulted in duplication of functions since both are 
established to tackle the challenges of infrastructure 
development, environmental protection and the 
empowerment of the people of the Niger Delta. Coupled with 
this is the problem of funding. The allocation to the ministry 
in the 2009 budget was paltry which raised concerns in 
many quarters about its future. The experience of the NDDC 
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reinforces this apprehension going by funding deficit that 
has been its dominant feature. Probably this is why Kogbara 
argues that: “the NDDC does not need to be replaced or 
eclipsed because it can do everything that a ministry can 
do—if it is given the human and financial resources with 
which to play a dynamic coordinating role. There’s a very 
real risk that the new ministry will largely turn out to be 
nothing more than a glorified version of the NDDC and a 
cynical, expensive window-dressing.” (International Crisis 
Group, 2009: 10). There was even an attempt by the 
government to embark on constructive engagement with the 
militant groups. The rationale behind this is to negotiate 
with the militants to form private security companies 
through this they will be provided with job opportunities by 
providing security for oil installations. The dangers in such 
engagements and popular perceptions that are against such 
idea explain why it has not yet happened. 
One can argue that throughout Yar’Adua presidency, 
the volatile situation in the Niger Delta has not been 
significantly improved as acts of criminality are on the rise. 
With the ascendancy of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, an indigene 
of the Niger Delta, as President and Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria following 
Yar’Adua’s death in May 2010, the whole nation is looking to 
see how he (Goodluck) will solve the problems of ‘his region’ 
    
 
 
7. Conclusion and Perspective 
 
The foregoing analysis has shown that the volatile 
security situation in the Niger Delta constitutes real threats 
to the survival of the Nigerian post-colony and it needs to be 
addressed by the Federal Government. Though SALW 
proliferation increases the intensity and duration of violence 
and, abets militancy in the region but they do not cause the 
Niger Delta crisis. Now, what is germane is to address the 
fundamental grievances of the oil-bearing communities. The 
proclamation of amnesty by the Yar’Adua administration is 
regarded as a palliative measure that will have no significant 
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effects on the conflict trajectory. As long as the Federal 
Government fails to tackle the root causes of the conflict, the 
people of the region will continue to be restive with negative 
consequences of arms proliferation while insecurity will 
continue unabated. Thus, the Nigerian state needs to, 
seriously and sincerely, attend to the problems confronting 
the people of the region, such as; environmental insecurity, 
socio-economic underdevelopment and poverty, and also 
address the problems associated with the country’s 
federalism, which, in both structure and praxis, is wanton. 
Thus the following policy options, among others, are 
considered necessary to address the Niger Delta crisis. 
 First, the Nigerian federalism is presently skewed and 
marked by extreme centralization where power is 
concentrated in the centre at the expense of the federating 
states. This is disadvantageous to the oil-bearing 
communities because it has led to such, according to Suberu 
(1996: 67), “inauspicious and obnoxious outcomes as the 
erosion of the autonomy and security that genuinely 
federalists arrangements assure for minorities, the 
inordinate appropriation by the centre of the resources of the 
oil-rich Delta minority communities, and the direct and often 
counter-productive intervention of central authorities in 
those local and regional issues, such as the determination of 
local government boundaries, that are best left to 
subnational authorities or communities.” Attempt by the 
Obasanjo administration to address the problems of Nigerian 
federalism through Justice Niki Tobi-led National Political 
Reform Conference in 2005 failed to achieve its objectives 
because it is believed that the conference was engineered by 
the government to achieve the hidden agenda of President 
Obasanjo. It is argued here that the best way to address this 
contentious issue is through a Sovereign National 
Conference of all ethnic nationalities. How to adequately 
cater for the needs of ethnic minority groups, especially the 
oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta region should be 
one of the foremost priorities of the present administration. 
This can be achieved through constitutional amendments 
where some degrees of autonomy will be accorded the 
federating states, especially the oil producing ones, regarding 
mining rights and also through initiating sincere 
programmes that can address the structural defects of the 
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Nigerian federal system of government within the context of 
good governance, transparency and accountability. 
 Second, there is the need for the Federal Government 
to increase the derivation formula from the present 13%. 
Such increase in financial allocation to the oil-producing 
states will dampen down tensions and address the 
environment and socio-economic problems of the area. These 
efforts need to be strengthened by establishing mediatory 
and regulatory institutions to monitor the money spent by oil 
producing states’ governments in order to ensure that the 
financial resources are used on the provision of public goods 
and services. The Federal Government needs to intensify its 
anti-corruption efforts in this regard.  
 Third, the destruction of the Niger Delta environment 
by the MNOCs should be addressed by the Nigerian state. 
The region’s ecosystem can be protected by enacting laws 
that will regulate the activities of MNOCs and also agencies 
to monitor such activities and enforce compliance. Fourth, 
the Nigerian government should empower Niger Delta’s 
youth by initiating youth empowerment schemes. 
Government needs to accord high priority to vocational 
training and invest in education (especially peace education) 
and also provide them (Niger Delta’s youth) with job 
opportunities after such training. This will definitely 
dissuade them from joining militant groups and will 
inculcate in them the importance of harmonious intra- and 
inter-ethnic relations as preconditions for physical, socio-
economic and human developments.  
Fifth, Nigeria needs to improve the quality of its 
democratic process in order to increase the confidence of the 
oil-bearing communities in the Nigerian nation-state project. 
The perceived political marginalization and socio-economic 
exclusion of the people of the Niger Delta can be overcome by 
reforming the country’s democratic process as this will 
guarantee their commitments to the Nigerian state. This is 
probably why Francis and Sardesai (2008: 48) argue that 
“conflict is a normal feature in any democratic society; 
however the disconnect between state and society in Nigeria 
has led to a situation in which conflict cannot be managed 
within the political process, leading people to increasingly 
turn towards violent forms of conflict. Strengthening the voice 
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of communities in the Niger Delta by working towards free 
and fair elections would go a long way towards restoring the 
legitimacy of the current administration and of democracy in 
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